Read-Uncommitted Transactions for Smart Contract Performance by Cook, Victor et al.
Read-Uncommitted Transactions for
Smart Contract Performance
Victor Cook∗, Zachary Painter†, Christina Peterson‡, Damian Dechev §
Computer Science Department, University of Central Florida
Orlando, USA
∗victor.cook@knights.ucf.edu, †zacharypainter@knights.ucf.edu,
‡clp8199@knights.ucf.edu, §dechev@cs.ucf.edu
Abstract—Smart contract transactions demonstrate issues of
performance and correctness that application programmers must
work around. Although the blockchain consensus mechanism
approaches ACID compliance, use cases that rely on frequent
state changes are impractical due to the block publishing inter-
val of O(101) seconds. The effective isolation level is READ-
COMMITTED, only revealing state transitions at the end of
the block interval. Values read may be stale and not match
program order, causing many transactions to fail when a block is
committed. This paper perceives the blockchain as a transactional
data structure, using this analogy in the development of a
new algorithm, Hash-Mark-Set (HMS), that improves transaction
throughput by providing a READ-UNCOMMITTED view of state
variables. HMS creates a directed acyclic graph (DAG) from the
pending transaction pool. The transaction order derived from
the DAG is used to provide a READ-UNCOMMITTED view of
the data for new transactions, which enter the DAG as they are
received. An implementation of HMS is provided, interoperable
with Ethereum and ready for use in smart contracts. Over a wide
range of transaction mixes, HMS is demonstrated to improve
throughput. A side product of the implementation is a new
technique, Runtime Argument Augmentation (RAA), that allows
smart contracts to communicate with external data services
before submitting a transaction. RAA has use cases beyond HMS
and can serve as a lightweight replacement for blockchain oracles.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Smart contracts, Concurrent algo-
rithms, Transaction throughput
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains rely on a consensus mechanism to agree upon
the sequencing of client transactions in a block, commit-
ting transactions as a group to the distributed ledger. Smart
contracts are the interface to process client requests and
send transactions to the blockchain peer network. A block of
transactions must be validated to ensure that the sequence is
consistent. All peers on the network perform the validation
step by re-executing the transactions within the block and
checking that the initial and final states match, introducing
latency.
Latency resulting from the publishing and validation of a
block decreases the success rate for the transactions in the
block due to the possibility of stale reads of state variables,
also known as storage variables. Changes to storage variables
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are only visible after they are committed to a published block.
This isolation level of intra-block transactions is called READ-
COMMITTED. Transactional reads of storage variables can be-
come outdated while waiting on the validation step since other
published blocks may update the storage variables, leading
to transaction failure. Additionally, since read operations can
only access the published storage variable value, intra-block
changes can also cause a transaction to fail due to a stale read.
A smart contract transaction is a concurrent method, of-
ten with semantic dependencies. The way block publishing
commits multiple smart contract transactions simultaneously
is analogous to the way a transactional data structure [1], [2]
commits multiple concurrent methods in what appears to be
a single atomic step. Using this analogy, the blockchain is a
blind transactional data structure that selects and sequences
concurrent method calls without regard for their semantics,
causing many to fail due to the restrictive READ-COMMITTED
isolation level. An ideal algorithm for blockchain transactions
would consider transaction semantics and include all related
transactions as a series in a block commit.
In this paper, we present Hash-Mark-Set (HMS), an algo-
rithm that increases the throughput of smart contract trans-
actions by providing a READ-UNCOMMITTED view of the
storage variables. HMS organizes the pool of pending trans-
actions (TxPool) on specific storage variables in a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) that establishes an ordering among the
transactions and enables an uncommitted view of the storage
variables to be retrieved. HMS reduces transactional failures
because the READ-UNCOMMITTED view increases the like-
lihood that a transaction has consistent inputs. Latency is
also reduced because concurrent actors will no longer need
to wait until a block is committed to see a change in storage
variables that is likely to be committed in the next block or
two. We integrate HMS into smart contracts through Runtime
Argument Augmentation (RAA), our proposed technique that
allows smart contracts to communicate with external data
services prior to sending a transaction.
An interoperable implementation of the solution is provided
and demonstrated on the Ethereum blockchain. State through-
put, defined in Section III-A as throughput of successful
blockchain transactions, increases by a factor of five across
a range of transaction mixes. By adding the cooperation of
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blockchain miners, state throughput increases by an order of
magnitude.
We make the following contributions:
1) Present Hash-Mark-Set (HMS), an algorithm organizing
a pool of pending transactions that share state variables.
2) Introduce Runtime Argument Augmentation (RAA), a
novel technique for smart contracts to communicate with
external data services.
3) Demonstrate improvements to latency and state through-
put when HMS provides a READ-UNCOMMITTED view
to smart contract clients.
4) Provide an interoperable implementation for Ethereum:
https://github.com/area67/sereth
II. BACKGROUND
A few issues specific to the blockchain are discussed in this
section.
A. Blockchain Transactions
A blockchain is a distributed ledger maintained by one or
more peers following a communication protocol and agreeing
on a consensus mechanism. The ledger is written in chunks
called blocks that are linked in a practically unforgeable
cryptographic chain, replicated among many peers to avoid
dependence upon a single entity. State variables that are
recorded on the blockchain are called storage variables in
Ethereum. Bitcoin was the first blockchain [3], providing
transactions on a store and exchange of value, i.e. a currency.
A transaction is a concurrent method call that if successful,
changes the state of the ledger. A block may contain from
zero up to a finite number of transactions, typically O(101)
to O(103). Well known database transaction models such
as ACID and BASE are applicable to the blockchain [4],
motivating our use of isolation levels READ-UNCOMMITTED
and READ-COMMITTED.
B. Concurrent Smart Contracts
Going beyond exchange of value, later blockchains added
the ability to program arbitrary instruction sequences in a
transaction. Their programming languages are Turing complete
[5] and their programs are called smart contracts [6]. Concur-
rency is framed in the words of Sergey and Hobor, “Accounts
using smart contracts in a blockchain are like threads using
concurrent objects in shared memory” [7]. Herlihy endorsed
this line of reasoning in a keynote address [8], exhorting
concurrency researchers to “civilize” the blockchain.
Invoking a smart contract function that may change ledger
state creates a transaction and sends it to the network. It should
be noted that some smart contract functions, designated pure
or view, cannot change ledger state and they do not create
transactions. The unprocessed transaction pool of pending
transactions is referred to as the TxPool. The network of
peers is a concurrent system and it follows that its incoming
transactions, found in the TxPool, is a concurrent history.
The real time ordering of a concurrent history is a total
ordering over the transactions in a concurrent history such
that transaction T1 is ordered before transaction T2 if T1 is
received by the TxPool before T2.
C. Miner Privilege
On Ethereum, Bitcoin and many other blockchains, the
inclusion and sequencing of transactions in a block does not
follow real time order, rather transactions are arranged in a
total order that is arbitrary and subject to the same economic
incentives that drive blockchain progress [9]. This is called the
block order. Special peers, called miners have the privilege
of deciding what goes into a block and in what order. Each
transaction is isolated and a miner generally has no way
of knowing if one may depend upon another, so the rules
for selecting transactions are flexible. Miners generally favor
transactions with higher fees, but they may favor some peers,
including themselves. They may use altruistic criteria such as
including only small transactions or those from peers with low
bandwidth.
The discretion given to miners in the protocol works as if the
scheduler of a CPU could favor particular threads. Ethereum
miners read the TxPool grouped by peer addresses (aka
threads) with transactions ordered by a counter called a nonce.
Miners may favor an address and include its transactions
before another peer without regard for the real time order
in which they were received. Miners may refuse to include
any transactions sent from particular addresses. But a miner
may not commit a transaction from a given address to a block
out of nonce order. This means that blockchain transactions
from the same address are executed in the order they are sent,
while the order of transactions from different addresses is
not defined. Since a blockchain transaction is a concurrent
method, we can describe this behavior as being equivalent to
sequential consistency, a correctness property such that history
of methods is equivalent to a legal sequential history, and all
methods take effect in program order [10].
The TxPool is shared by peers on the network, including
miners. Intuitively, if communication were instantaneous, all
peers would see the same TxPool, and the order in which
the transactions were received would match their real time
ordering, i.e. the order in which they were sent. Miner privilege
would still allow the transactions to be placed in a block in an
order different from the real time order. The outcome of our
READ-UNCOMMMITTED view of state is subject to network
synchronization and miner privilege. Information about the
TxPool is not available to the smart contract as it submits
transactions.
D. Block Publishing and Validation
Blocks of selected transactions are committed all at once
in a super transaction called block publishing. Transactions
are interpreted sequentially within a block according to the
block order, using the previous ledger state (block) as the
initial context. Changes to storage variables are not visible
until they are committed to a block and the block is pub-
lished. The changes to storage variables during the interval of
block publication are called intra-block changes. Transactions
within the block are affected by the intra-block changes, but
post-publication transactions read the block final value of a
storage variable from the previous block, none of the current
changes. Once published there is no opportunity to re-order the
concurrent methods. These values were read from the previous
block, published block interval seconds ago. The block interval
defines the latency.
Block publishing is effectively a read lock until the next
block is committed. Dirty reads are not allowed. In database
terms the isolation level of intra-block transactions is READ-
COMMITTED. To accept a published block every peer must
perform block validation, the task of checking that the block
is consistent with the state of the network. Transactions
committed to a block must be consistent in that they must
include the effects of all previous transactions. The process of
peers redundantly validating transactions in a block is called
transaction replay. Block publishing and validation takes a
significant amount of time O(101) to O(102) seconds, creating
latency.
Since only the final state of the block is published, interme-
diate states become invisible without a detailed replay of the
transactions in the block, something that a typical smart con-
tract cannot do. The loss of intermediate states during a block
update is a consequence of the READ-COMMITTED view of
state variables. This low isolation level avoids blocking but
may allow a great number of transactions to be rejected later
as inconsistent. Transactions that seem valid when submitted
are rejected because the values on which they are based were
stale. The number of transactions that are rejected impacts
state throughput. Where state changes are frequent and there
are many transactions in the pool to be interleaved in a block,
a large percentage of transactions fail. To say a transaction
failed means that it would have violated the consistency of
the sequential history of the block in which it is embedded.
To keep the sequential history of the block consistent, the
transaction is included in the block, but has no effect on the
system state. In database terms the transaction was rolled back.
A principle cause of failure is the high latency imposed on
reading changes to persistent storage variables.
E. Blockchain Oracles
A characteristic of the blockchain is that security concerns
related to the adversarial distributed environment impose re-
strictions on information transfer. Unassisted, smart contracts
operate in a bubble, allowed to view only public blockchain
state variables via getter functions and not allowed to call any
outside sources of information. The discussion in Section II-D
about peers replaying blocks can explain this. Since all peers
must replay and validate the block, they all must see the
same state changes. If a contract is using an outside source
of information, no matter how reliable, it may change with
time or due to corrections or it may become unavailable. This
would cause some peers to see a different state than others, and
the block could not be validated. The problem can be solved
with a smart contract that mediates a secure and verifiable
connection to external data feeds [11]. Such a service is also
called a blockchain oracle [12], [13].
F. Challenging Use Cases
Blockchain performance, measured in terms of transaction
throughput and latency, is a limiting factor for many use cases
[14]–[17]. Latency and throughput are considered together
in this paper because the READ-COMMITTED latency of
state variable limits the throughput of successful transactions.
This ubiquitous blockchain latency has been dubbed, ‘the
long system freeze” [18]. Our example use case is a de-
centralized market to buy and sell assets, a core use case
driving blockchain research and investment. This example also
represents the general case of concurrent actors reading a time
sensitive shared state variable.
Say that trading opens at a certain price, visible to all
buyers. Orders are received on the network to be processed.
To simplify, orders must be at the exact price, i.e. there
are no limit or market orders. The price changes frequently
and unpredictably due to market dynamics. If 100 orders are
received at the published price near the start of a block interval
and the price changes after the first order, then only one
will be accepted. Blockchain correctness (safety, consistency)
is preserved by the expedient of invalidating 99 of the 100
transactions in this example, clearly an inefficient mechanism.
Due to miner privilege, the first order submitted in time
may not be the first included in the block. Progress of the
system cannot be fair in any case because there is not enough
information in the TxPool on which to base a real time
order of the requests from different peers. Even with such
information, miners are not bound to prevent starvation, quite
the contrary they may cause it. Information is also hidden
from the buyers querying the smart contract for the price.
Block replay is not available within the smart contract. Unless
it is separately analyzed, 98 of the 99 price changes are
invisible to participants and valuable market information about
intermediate price changes is lost. The arbitrary transaction
priority combined with read latency also creates a vulnerability
known as blockchain frontrunning [19].
III. METHODOLOGY
This paper presents Hash-Mark-Set (HMS), an algorithm
that overcomes the limitations of the READ-COMMITTED
isolation level by providing a READ-UNCOMMITTED view of
storage variables. The READ-UNCOMMITTED view alleviates
the problems in the example of Section II-F. Clients can
observe partial changes within the block prior to publishing,
reducing the chance that a transaction will fail due to a stale
read. The Mark in HMS also establishes a partial intra-block
order that a cooperating miner can enforce. Such cooperation
is reasonable given financial incentives that might be offered
by decentralized asset exchanges.
HMS provides a READ-UNCOMMITTED view by maintain-
ing the transactions in a directed acyclic graph (DAG) that rep-
resents an ordering among the transactions in the unprocessed
transaction pool, TxPool, and applying a topological sort to
the longest branch to retrieve the value of an unpublished
storage variable. To enable the READ-UNCOMMITTED view
to be accessible through smart contracts, we propose Runtime
Argument Augmentation (RAA), our proposed technique that
modifies the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) interpreter
to apply the HMS algorithm and access the value of an
unpublished storage variable. The RAA technique is made
available to users through our proposed smart contract Sereth.
To evaluate the performance benefits of our proposed
methodology, we present a new metric, state throughput,
which measures the throughput of successful transactions.
State throughput disregards failed transactions in the through-
put measurement, which provides a better representation of
the rate at which state changes are made in comparison
to raw throughput. In the following subsections, we define
state throughput, provide the Sereth smart contract application
programming interface, and explain HMS and RAA, the two
innovations of this paper.
A. State Throughput
Blockchains are different from databases in the following
way: failed transactions are included in the persistent shared
ledger. Because a block may include a large percentage of
failed transactions, raw throughput of transactions per second
is not an adequate measure of performance. In the example
described in Section II-F, raw throughput was 100 per interval,
but 99 of 100 transactions fail. In a database these rolled
back transactions would not count in throughput, but in a
blockchain they are included in the block. A new metric, state
throughput, Tstate, is defined here as the product of the raw
throughput and the ratio of transactions included in a block
that successfully make state changes. State throughput divided
by raw throughput yields the transaction efficiency η.
Tstate
Traw
= η (1)
Transactions in the TxPool form a concurrent history, with
a non-deterministic outcome. We observed that transaction
failure can be reduced by obtaining a view of state that is
more likely to be consistent at the moment the transaction
is committed to a block. To maximize η, transactions are
organized to provide a predictive view of state, ordering
transactions such that the order closely matches the real time
order in which the transactions were received.
B. Sereth Smart Contract
Our implementation of HMS for Ethereum is called Sereth,
a variation of Geth, the name of the standard client. Sereth is
implemented as an interoperable Ethereum client that can be
substituted for one or more peers in any standard Ethereum
network, public or private. The Sereth smart contract shown
in Listing 1 manages the price and accepts the set and buy
transactions from addresses on the blockchain. The mark and
get functions are read only. They do not create transactions
but are used to return the intra-block state that will be used
in set and buy. This intra-block state view uses RAA to get
Listing 1. Sereth smart contract.
pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
contract Sereth {
...
// Mark, Set and Get are methods on state variables
// managed by the Hash-Mark-Set algorithm.
function mark(bytes32[3] raa)
private pure returns(bytes32) {
return raa[1];
}
function set(bytes32[3] fpv) public {
// If mark is valid, set new mark and value.
if (keccak256(fpv[1]) == keccak256(p[1])) {
nSet++;
p[0] = bytes32(msg.sender);
p[1] = keccak256(fpv[1], fpv[2]);
p[2] = fpv[2];
}
}
function get(bytes32[3] raa)
public pure returns(bytes32) {
return raa[2];
}
// Function buy() demonstrates a dynamic pricing use case
// for the Hash-Mark-Set transactional data structure.
function buy(bytes32[3] offer) public {
// If mark and price match then buy() succeeds.
if ((keccak256(offer[1]) == keccak256(p[1])) &&
(keccak256(offer[2]) == keccak256(p[2]))) {
nBuy++;
p[0] = bytes32(msg.sender);
}
}
}
the results of the HMS algorithm. The values are written into
the function arguments using RAA and then returned to the
calling address.
C. Hash-Mark-Set
Hash-Mark-Set takes advantage of an underutilized com-
munication channel among the peers on a blockchain, the
transaction pool (TxPool). We created a smart contract,
Sereth.sol, to manage the state variables. In Sereth,
function arguments are formatted so they contain three key
elements within the transaction, address, mark, and value.
The address field contains the address of the sender of the
transaction. The mark field contains a Keccak256 hash [20]
which solidifies a transactions place in a series of Sereth trans-
actions. The value field indicates how the sender would like to
modify the state variable. Together, these elements are referred
to as a transaction’s AMV . To create a transaction using
the Sereth contract, one must pass in three parameters: flag,
previous_mark, and value. These parameters are referred to
as the FPV . The FPV is easily visible as a string of bytes
within the transactions input field.
We define a transaction’s mark such that
given Txn1 which follows Txn0, Txn1.mark =
Keccak256(Txn0.mark, Txn1.val). This creates a
sequentially consistent ordering between any number of
transactions in what we call a series. To create a series, the
FPV of each transaction in the TxPool is extracted from their
respective Data fields. By matching the previous_mark
of a transaction with the mark of a different transaction,
we can determine a strict order of all Sereth transactions in
the current TxPool. This provides the smart contract with a
Read-Uncommitted view of the intra-block state. In addition,
because every state change is linked by a unique hash that
includes the value, multiple state changes sequenced in the
atomic block update are preserved.
Algorithm 1 shows the HMS algorithm as implemented on
the Ethereum blockchain. Users interact with the algorithm
through an Ethereum contract. We refer to line x of algorithm
A as A:x.
Algorithm 1 Transaction Serialization Algorithm
1: procedure HASHMARKSET(INPUT) . Serialize a
blockchain transaction pool
2: RAA← input
3: txnList← PROCESS(TxPool) . Filter TxPool
4: if len(txnList) == 0 then
5: RAA← specialV alue
6: return
7: series← SERIES(txnList) . Create series
8: RAA← COPY(series.tail.FPV )
Algorithm 2 Process Transactions
1: procedure PROCESS(TXPOOL, INPUT) . Filter TxPool
for HMS transactions
2: filteredList[]
3: for txn ∈ TxPool do
4: if SIGNATURE(txn) == “set” & SUCCESS(txn)
then
5: txn.FPV ← txn.input
6: txn.mark ←
Keccak(txn.FPV [1], txn.FPV [2])
7: filteredList.push(new Node(txn))
8: return filteredList
9: procedure SUCCESS(TXN) . Determines if a transaction
succeeded or not
10: FPV ← txn.input
11: if FPV [0] == successF lag || FPV [0] ==
headF lag then
12: return true
13: return false
A call to HashMarkSet() is made from the EVM interpreter
when the transaction being processed has a function signature
that matches that of a Sereth transaction. The RAA variable
on line 1:8 represents the storage variable value obtained using
the RAA technique. We first extract the RAA from the given
input field of the transaction we are processing. This process
is simple, as each element is stored in a contiguous 32 bytes
within input. By writing the result of HashMarkSet() to RAA,
the result will be made visible within the contract’s execution.
Algorithm 2 details how the current transaction pool is
filtered and then returned to the main function for handling.
For each transaction in the pool, we check that the function
signature is equal to one of the write functions from our HMS
contract. Additionally, we check the first 32 bytes of the FPV
for a flag indicating one of several possible states for the
transaction. Due to this filtering only a small percentage of
the TxPool requires processing, so the overhead of HMS is
relatively small.
First, the transaction may be one of the first HMS trans-
actions that appeared during the current block. In this case,
we consider the transaction a head candidate, meaning that
it or another transaction with the same flag will serve as
the head of the serialized list of transactions for the current
block. This allows us to easily continue the list from the
previous block without being able to view the state variable.
The second possible state indicates that the transaction is
not a head candidate, and at the time of the transaction’s
submission, it was found to be the successor to the current
tail of the series. If a transaction contains neither of these
flags, it is considered rejected and is not included in the list of
relevant transactions. If a transaction is accepted, The FPV
is then extracted from the input field. The FPV contains
previous_mark and value, which are the two values needed
to calculate the mark of a transaction and determine its place
in the series. A node is created from the transaction for later
inclusion in a linked data structure.
Once txnList has been populated by transactions from the
TxPool on line 1:3, we check on line 1:4 if the list is empty. If
so, the submitted transaction is the first Sereth transaction sent
in the current block, and the way to know if it matches the
previous mark is to check the state variable within the contract.
In this case, a flag is written to the data field, which will be
visible to the contract. The contract value will be written in
the last 32 bytes of the transaction FPV by the sender.
If the list contains one or more transactions, then we know
that there already exists at least one series for the current
block. Algorithm 3 contains the functions which return the
most valid series from a list of Sereth transactions.
Line 3:1 refers to Series(), which iterates through each
transaction in the list of Sereth transactions and forms graph
relations between all transactions with corresponding mark/-
value hashes. Due to the uncertain nature of concurrency, it is
possible for a transaction to have multiple potential successors,
but only one predecessor.
At line 3:9 we locate from multiple potential head nodes
the one that produces the deepest graph. From that graph,
the deepest branch is our series. This logic mirrors that of
the blockchain, in which branches are resolved by taking the
longest branch.
D. Runtime Argument Augmentation
Blockchain oracles provide a secure and verifiable medium
for smart contracts to access external data feeds, but still suffer
from stale reads due to latency. In our implementation of
HMS it became clear that a traditional oracle would not satisfy
the requirement for intra-block data. To overcome the limita-
tions of oracles, we propose Runtime Argument Augmentation
(RAA), a technique that provides data to a smart contract by
using the argument list as a channel to pass information. RAA
Algorithm 3 Create a Series
1: procedure SERIES(TXNLIST) . Create a serialized list
from a set of transactions
2: for txn ∈ txnList do
3: for txn2 ∈ txnList do
4: if txn.mark == txn2.FPV [1] then
5: txn2.prevTxn← txn
6: txn.nextTxns.push(txn2)
7: highestDepth← 0
8: longestSeries← nil
9: for txn ∈ txnList such that txn.FPV [0] ==
headF lag do
10: depth← 1
11: path← [txn]
12: maxDepth← 0
13: maxPath← []
14: DEEPESTBRANCH(txn, depth,&maxDepth,
path, maxPath)
15: if maxDepth > highestDepth then
16: highestDepth← maxDepth
17: longestSeries← maxPath
18: return longestSeries
19: procedure DEEPESTBRANCH(HEAD, DEPTH, PATH,
MAXDEPTH, MAXPATH) . Recursively find deepest
branch
20: if len(head.nextTxns) == 0 then
21: if depth > maxDepth then
22: maxDepth = depth
23: maxPath = path
24: return
25: for txn ∈ head.nextTxns do
26: path.push(txn)
27: DEEPESTBRANCH(txn, depth+ 1, path,
maxDepth, maxPath)
28: path.remove(txn)
is a modification to the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
interpreter, written in Golang. Figure 1 is an activity diagram
showing the modified processing. In activity E2 the EVM
interpreter checks to see if a function is requesting external
data items using RAA. If so, the interpreter calls the RAA
provider in activities R1 to R3, implemented as a Golang
service compiled into the EVM. Data is obtained from the
RAA provider and written into the function arguments. The
data types of the items being requested must match the data
types of the arguments. In E3 the function returns the result of
evaluation using the modified arguments to the smart contract
for use in activity S3. RAA is flexible: any computation can
be accomplished by the RAA provider, and the information
can flow in both directions. RAA is fast because it is written
as an extension of the EVM. A smart contract using RAA
is indistinguishable to unmodified clients running Geth, who
merely see that arguments are passed in and a result returned.
There are some limitations. RAA cannot be used to modify
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Fig. 1. RAA activity diagram
the arguments of a smart contract function that may send a
transaction. This is because transactions along with their inputs
are cryptographically signed by the sending address, stored
in parameters msg.hash and msg.sender. Without this
protection a malicious Geth client could modify the inputs of
a transaction, for example doubling the price offered for an
item or changing the delivery address. In testing the limits of
RAA we found that the modified transactions would still be
mined, but would not be accepted by peers who must validate
the newly created block. In order to use RAA information in
a transaction, a smart contract or other blockchain actor calls
the RAA function first, then uses the information provided to
improve the subsequent transaction. This is the process used
to obtain the experimental results that follow.
IV. CORRECTNESS
Concurrent systems are expected to satisfy correctness
(safety) and progress (liveness) properties. Correctness is
determined according to a defined correctness condition pre-
sented in literature [10]. HMS is designed for the sequential
consistency correctness condition because miners are required
to preserve the nonce order when committing a transaction
from a given thread to a block. Since the nonce is a counter
that reflects the sequential ordering of transactions issued by
the same thread and a blockchain transaction is analogous to
a concurrent method, the blockchain is inherently sequentially
consistent. In the following lemma we show that HMS gen-
erates a series that provides a sequentially consistent ordering
of the transactions in the longest branch. The benefit of
generating a series of transactions in the longest branch is that
it offers the greatest potential for optimum state throughput.
Lemma 1. The series generated from HMS preserves a
sequentially consistent ordering of transactions invoked in the
longest branch of the directed acyclic graph.
Proof. For each transaction T in the transaction pool, if the
signature is a set operation, and T is either a possible head
candidate or is a successor to the current tail in the series, then
T ’s mark is updated by hashing the predecessor transaction’s
mark and value, and the list of transactions to be considered for
the series is amended to include transaction T . If the length of
the list of transactions is larger than one, then HMS generates
a series of transactions by calling the SERIES function with
the transaction list as input. It now must be shown that the
generated series is both sequentially consistent and the longest
branch. The SERIES function creates an adjacency list of all
transactions in the transaction list such that a transaction T2
that is a member of T1’s list indicates that T2 is a successor
to T1. The SERIES function then iterates through the potential
head candidates and applies the DEEPESTBRANCH algorithm.
Each recursive call to DEEPESTBRANCH will iterate through
the list of successor transactions in the adjacency list and
apply DEEPESTBRANCH to each successor transaction until
a transaction with no successors is reached. At each recursive
call to DEEPESTBRANCH, transaction txn passed as an input
parameter is amended to the path. Since the exploration of
the adjacency list guarantees that all successor transactions are
visited after a predecessor transaction, any path generated from
DEEPESTBRANCH will be sequentially consistent because the
program order established in the adjacency list is preserved.
Since the depth at each recursive call of DEEPESTBRANCH
is incremented by one, and a path that exceeds the maximum
depth is recorded upon termination of the recursive calls, the
final recorded path by DEEPESTBRANCH will be the longest
branch within the adjacency list.
Progress of the underlying blockchain (the computer) is
assumed. We focus here on the progress of smart contract
methods using a view of state variables managed by HMS.
Lock freedom is defined as ensuring that some concurrent actor
makes progress, and this is true for the blockchain as a whole
but not for an individual smart contract. Miners may assign a
low priority to a particular contract so it makes no progress. At
peak times, many more transactions are sent to the network
than can be included in a block. Transactions sent may be
lost due to network failures, memory limitations or peers not
replaying them. Miners may refuse to include transactions for
arbitrary reasons. As a result, the progress guarantee provided
by Ethereum is smart contract termination [21], [22]. Since
the TxPool is a finite list of transactions, Algorithm 2 trivially
terminates. Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3 terminate given
that the recursive function DEEPESTBRANCH terminates. We
now show in the following lemma that DEEPESTBRANCH
terminates.
Lemma 2. DEEPESTBRANCH presented in Algorithm 3 is
guaranteed to terminate.
Proof. The txnList in the SERIES function is a finite list of
transactions because it is a subset of the TxPool generated
by the PROCESS function. Therefore, each list within the
adjacency list of transactions constructed by the nested for-
loop on line 2 of Algorithm 3 will also contain a finite
number of transactions. Since the txn.mark computed by
PROCESS establishes an ordering among the transactions in
txnList, the adjacency list of transactions will not contain
any cycles due to the if-statement on line 4 of Algorithm 3.
DEEPESTBRANCH will be invoked by the SERIES function no
more than the number of transactions contained in txnList.
For each invocation of DEEPESTBRANCH, a recursive call to
DEEPESTBRANCH is made for each transaction in head’s list
of successor transactions. Since DEEPESTBRANCH is only
invoked on the successors of head, and each list in the
adjacency list of transactions is finite, it is guaranteed that
every invocation of DEEPESTBRANCH will eventually reach
a transaction with no successors. Upon reaching a transaction
with no successors, DEEPESTBRANCH terminates on line 24
of Algorithm 3.
V. RESULTS
This section shows experimental results of tests of the HMS
algorithm on a private Ethereum blockchain. The chain used
for testing is a fork of an open source multi-peer private net-
work configuration [23]. Experiments were hosted on Ubuntu
16.04 EC2 servers in the AWS cloud. The private network
was configured to be a model of the Ethereum mainnet or
the Ropsten testnet. Proof of work was used as the consensus
mechanism. The block difficulty, transaction fees, processing
power of the peers and peering topology were adjusted to
produce block size and interval in the range of production
Ethereum blockchains.
Interoperability was tested by running experiments with
a mix of peers running standard Geth and modified Sereth
clients. The first experiments were qualitative to demonstrate
practical use of the two innovations of this paper: HMS and
RAA. Smart contract functions that created transactions were
followed through the process of invocation, interpretation,
transactions sent to the TxPool, replay, mining and validation.
The Sereth client operated interchangeably with Geth clients
on the same network. This is not surprising because Ethereum
already supports a variety of clients with subtle differences,
all following the same protocol. Deployment of Sereth in the
wild would not require a fork or any special permission from
the network. The Solidity smart contract equipped with RAA
also functioned even when deployed to a Geth client, although
of course the substitution of arguments did not take place and
they were returned unchanged.
Next we demonstrated that a sequential history was properly
handled by sending a series of test transactions from the
address of a single peer so that there is only one possible
history, where real time order equals nonce order equals block
order. As expected, the transaction failure rate was zero and
the transaction efficiency η was 1.0.
The quantitative experiments using concurrent peers demon-
strated the effectiveness of HMS and the importance of
transaction efficiency. Experiments considered the history of
program execution on a single shared variable P where P is
an object containing the AMV tuple described in the HMS
algorithm. The dynamic pricing exchange from Section II-F
is used to motivate the experiments, with the value of P
representing the price. Two transaction types are used in the
experiments: buy (buys one item at the current price) and set
(changes the price). A ratio of buys (READ-UNCOMMITTED)
to sets (WRITES) was used as a non-dimensional parameter
that would scale up to larger servers as the absolute number
of transactions increased. The number of set transactions was
varied from 100 to 5, yielding a buy to set ratio of from 1:1
to 20:1.
Figure 2 depicts a plot of state throughput measured at
different buy set ratios. Each data point represents the result
of 100 buy transactions, so state throughput is equivalent to
η expressed as a percentage. Transactions were submitted at
an interval of one second, resembling a moderate throughput
smart contract use case. This interval was sufficient to demon-
strate the problem of stale reads and can easily be reproduced
with ordinary servers using the provided source code. The sets
are evenly spaced over the processing of the buys. The lines
are smoothed averages of the points shown, with the shaded
areas representing the 90 percent confidence interval for the
lines.
A. Standard Geth client
The baseline scenario sends transactions to an unmod-
ified peer running the standard Geth client. The transac-
tion efficiency at different buy to set ratios is labeled as
“geth_unmodified” in Figure 2. In this scenario, buy transac-
tions that read the price P from block n−1 and are included in
block n before the price is modified will be successful, while
all other buys will fail. When there are many price sets, as in
the experiments with 1:1 and 2:1 ratios, only a few buys are
successful. In some runs no buy transactions succeeded at all.
The efficiency increases somewhat as the ratio of buys to sets
goes above 10:1 because there are more buys reading correct
values before an intra-block set occurs. However it remains
poor for two reasons.
First, with a low ratio of buys it is unlikely for a buy to
land in the very beginning of the block before any sets take
place. Thus many will fail. Second, even as the ratio increases,
because of the large transaction pool there are often no buys
going into block n + 1 that have a valid view of block n.
Instead, block n is assembled from buys that were submitted a
few blocks ago, so they may have a view of block n−2, n−3 or
older blocks. These buys fail because the blockchain state has
passed them by before they were included. This phenomenon
is frequently observed in public blockchains [24].
Although not shown in the plot, it was also observed
that with few state changes (high ratio of buys) transaction
efficiency becomes more sensitive to the transaction interval,
as miners may sequence a large number of buys together.
Fig. 2. Transaction efficiency η vs READ-UNCOMMITTED / WRITE ratio
Sets are not plotted. All of the sets succeed because they are
sent from the owner of the contract and they do not depend
on the previous price. If sets came from different addresses
some might have failed, but it is reasonable that the owner of
the contract is the only one allowed to set the price.
B. Hash-Mark-Set without miner assistance
The second experimental scenario, labeled as
“sereth_client” in Figure 2, used the modified Sereth
client on the network, implementing the HMS algorithm.
The set transactions were ordered with HMS while buy
transactions were sent exactly as in the baseline scenario.
Interleaved with the sets, any buy at the right mark and
price succeeded. The benefit of HMS in this scenario is that
the buy transactions have a READ-UNCOMMITTED view of
the likely state of the storage variable P when they will be
evaluated. This allows many more transactions to succeed.
A sequentially consistent ordering of the set operations was
established and their dependent buys have a view of the
state provided by HMS. Figure 2 shows an improvement
in throughput by approximately a factor of five over the
entire range of read /write ratios. These results were achieved
without miner assistance, so they could be accomplished
simply by running the modified client on the public Ethereum
blockchain, as long as access to the smart contract was via
these clients.
This experiment also demonstrates how HMS alleviates the
intra-block lost update problem. The FPV arguments in each
buy include the previous mark, a hash that relates it to an
interval between two sets. If a sequence occurs such as: set(5),
buy(5), set(7), set(5), buy(5), a particular buy(5) can prove that
it was sent during the first or the second interval the price was
set to 5. Linking each buy transactions to a particular set price
prevents the frontrunning attack mentioned in Section II-F.
C. Hash-Mark-Set with semantic mining
In the third experimental scenario, the inputs of the sec-
ond scenario were repeated with the miner using the HMS
algorithm to determine the block order of transactions. In this
scenario HMS information about the TxPool is available to
both smart contract users and miners. Since the miner now
has awareness of the semantics of the transactions, we call this
semantic mining. Previously miners would not reorder transac-
tions to increase transaction efficiency, but the semantic miners
have this capability. The line labeled “semantic_mining” in
Figure 2 shows the results. About 80 percent of transactions
succeed due to semantic mining providing interleaving in
conformance to the READ-UNCOMMITTED view used by
the smart contract clients when they sent the transactions.
Relative improvement in throughput was greatest with a high
frequency of price changes, i.e. where there are 1 or 2 buys
per set. At these ratios the advantage of having the miner
interleave transactions increases transaction efficiency from a
few percent to almost 90 percent, resulting in a factor of six
over the unassisted case. Overall, 10-20 percent of transactions
were lost due to the fact that the TxPool no longer contains
marked transactions immediately after the block is published.
Transaction efficiency could approach 100 percent if HMS
were extended to include the final values from replaying each
block. Other factors that would impact efficiency is if only
a fraction of the miners were assisting, or if communication
of the TxPool were impeded among the Sereth enabled peers.
Performance would be degraded in these cases but there would
still be benefits proportional to the participation.
VI. RELATED WORK
There are five main approaches to improve blockchain
throughput and latency: Reparameterization, sidechains, shard-
ing, leader election and invalid state tagging.
Reparameterization involves tuning the block size and in-
terval to network bandwidth and peer computing power [25].
HMS does not use reparameterization, but could influence
tuning trade-offs by decreasing the significance of block
interval.
Sidechains [26] increase throughput by creating transac-
tion channel networks such as Lightning [27]. As the name
implies they exploit parallelism by running multiple chains,
merging them to the main chain as needed to ensure correct-
ness. Sidechains have been implemented at scale on existing
blockchains. Recently generalized formally as state channels
[28], they can provide throughput gains of several orders
of magnitude. However the authors note state channels do
not solve the latency, or as they call it, “time granularity”
problem. The READ-UNCOMMITTED view provided by HMS
does solve this for specific state variables.
Sharding [29] increases throughput by isolating segments
of the blockchain peer network. Sharding requires changes to
consensus protocol but has been accepted by Ethereum [30]
with significant progress [31] and a target implementation date
in 2020. Like state channels, sharding is inherently parallel
and offers performance gains of several orders of magnitude.
Sharding is a global solution but would need customization to
address state throughput of individual smart contracts as does
HMS.
Bitcoin-NG “Next Generation” [18] uses leader election
with continuous serialization to modify the consensus protocol
in proof of work blockchains such as Bitcoin. Performance
gains scaling to the limits of network latency and individual
peer processing power are reported. Recent work [32] notes
the history of improvement and elaboration on the original
proposal. Our solution shares with Bitcoin-NG the concept of
continuous serialization to reduce the “long freeze” of latency,
but HMS does not require protocol changes to interoperate
with current blockchains.
The scope of our review was public blockchains, however
a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) proposal for Hyperledger
is relevant because it focused on the bottleneck of transaction
signing and ordering in block creation [33]. BFT uses a leader
to coordinate block creation achieving transaction rates of over
2000 per second on private blockchains. Unlike Ethereum,
Hyperledger tags transactions known to be based on invalid
states before they are ordered in a block, so time is not wasted
replaying the failed transactions. However the authors do not
consider transaction efficiency and the BFT ordering service
does not use semantics to reduce failures as HMS does.
Software Transactional Memory (STM) algorithms have
also been applied to blockchain throughput. The original ideas
in [34] using STM to enable concurrent processing of smart
contract methods were continued by [35]. These researchers
note the EVM is not parallel and the difficulty of determin-
ing transaction dependencies in a block, so in both papers
smart contracts were translated into C++ which is supported
by the STM library. Simulated miners then interleave and
order smart contract methods in STM to create a concurrent
execution. Speedups of up to 2x were achieved. Concurrency
based throughput gains in which “any sequential execution
will do” are different from HMS, which sequences smart
contract methods for transaction efficiency and increased state
throughput.
A parallel to HMS is found in an earlier STM paper [36]
whose language about “publishing” is prescient as it was
written before the blockchain was invented. A correctness con-
dition called Selective Strict Serialization (SSS) is introduced,
in which some transactions are strictly serialized and others
are not, but are marked to the serialized history. In Section IV
above we applied sequential consistency as the correctness
condition for our HMS algorithm. In our experiments HMS
establishes a fixed ordering for the state changes (sets) while
allowing the dependent transactions (buys) to be arbitrarily
interleaved. Multiple buys can occur in a price interval and
are not dependent upon each other. Within the interval any
order of buys is valid so they do not require an established
ordering constraint. Further work might show that SSS is a
correctness condition suitable for HMS.
There is relevant work on improving throughput and latency
of concurrent systems by reducing abort rate, defined as how
many times a transaction is retried before success [37]–[40].
This is different from our state throughout, which measures
efficiency of blockchain commits that are not repeated. High
abort rates due to delayed write visibility, where transaction
writes may only be read after commit, is addressed by Faleiro
et al. [41] in the proposal of piece-wise visibility (PWV), a
deterministic concurrency control protocol designed to enable
early write visibility. PWV divides a transaction into a set
of sub-transactions which are scheduled to be executed in a
serializable order. Each sub-transaction write is made visible
as soon as it commits, enabling the original transaction writes
to be visible prior to commit time. A DAG is used to order
database sub-transactions based on data dependencies. HMS
uses a DAG to order blockchain transactions in a sequentially
consistent fashion, and the final series of transactions is
derived from the deepest branch.
The fundamental difference between PWV and HMS is
that PWV enables writes to be visible inside the commit
protocol while HMS enables READ-UNCOMMITTED isolation
for smart contracts through our proposed RAA technique,
described in Section III-D. The PWV commit protocol only
provides write visibility after a transaction is submitted to the
database system, which limits the potential performance gains
in comparison to HMS that provides write visibility to smart
contract clients such that the requested data from RAA can be
utilized prior to transaction submission.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
State throughput, the throughput of successful transactions,
is proposed as the appropriate metric for smart contract
performance. An algorithm, Hash-Mark-Set, and a novel archi-
tectural technique, Runtime Argument Augmentation, are pre-
sented and demonstrated together on the Ethereum blockchain
to improve state throughput.
HMS provides smart contracts a READ-UNCOMMITTED
view of state. At the same time, HMS provides information
about transaction dependencies to the miners so they can adjust
the block order, called semantic mining. Miners cooperat-
ing with smart contracts using the HMS algorithm to order
dependent transactions were able to create blocks in which
most transactions were successful. This is demonstrated to
improve transaction efficiency from less than 5 percent to over
80 percent in cases where state changes are frequent, more
than an order of magnitude improvement in state throughput.
Even without semantic mining, the READ-UNCOMMITTED
view is helpful, increasing state throughput by a factor of
five across the full range of tested read to write ratios from
1:1 to 20:1. Latency (as a function of correct reads) was
also reduced in both scenarios, client modifications only and
semantic mining. In addition to the performance gains, HMS
solves the blockchain lost update and frontrunning attack
problems because transactions using READ-UNCOMMITTED
values keep a unique hash validated record of the particular
interval during which the value was read.
RAA is presented as a new technique to provide smart
contracts rapid communication with external data services. In
our experiments smart contracts used RAA to access READ-
UNCOMMITTED views of data necessary for transaction suc-
cess and thus increase transaction efficiency. RAA works at
the architectural level of the EVM, using the interpreter to
achieve high performance. Peers running the RAA modified
client were demonstrated to work interoperably with standard
peers.
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